It is argued that the theoretical literature on dual exchange markets has completely neglected the form of central bank intervention emphasized by the "classics". They advocated neutral intervention where the central banK sells in the capital market all foreign exchange it acquires from the current transactions. Current literature concentrates on the non-sterilized intervention. In a choice-theoretic framework it is shown that the form of intervention matters very much for the transmission of changes in foreign rate of interest and in terms of trade. On normative side it is shown that one can always design the dual exchange system in such a way that it is superior to the uniform fixed rate system.
I. Introduction
J. Marcus Fleming emphasized that the dual exchange market does not work properly unless the following holds: "It is sometimes thought to be of the essence of the dual exchange market that the rate for capital transactions is allowed to float freely without official intervention. This is a misunderstanding of the possibilities of the system.
There is no reasons why the authorities should not buy or sell foreign currency for domestic currency on the capital exchange market. Indeed, if they wish that market to make its maximum contributions to the equilibrium of the balance of payments as a whole they must (emphasis of JMF) , selling in the capital transactions market the foreign exchange they are acquiring in the current transactions market and buying in the former the foreign exchange they are selling in the latter (emphasis mine)." (Fleming, 1974) . Lanyi (1975) named this strategy as neutral intervention. But all of the the theoretical literature I am aware of has neglected this point raised by Fleming, See Flood (1978) , Flood and Marion (1982) , Marion (1981) , Adams and Greenwood (1985) , Aizenman (1985) , Obstfeld (1986) . Indeed, they have taken the lead given by Flood (1978) : "As other writers have pointed out, the type of dual exchange market system outlined above chokes off all net capital movements into or out of a country adopting the regime. ... If a domestic resident wants to purchase internationally traded securities he must either buy them from another domestic resident (no net capital flow) or purchase them from a foreign resident. But to purchase from a foreign resident the domestic resident must first obtain foreign exchange which is eligible for use in the financial market, and this foreign exchange can only arise from the sale by another domestic resident of traded securities to a foreigner. ... The result is no net capital movements once dual markets have been implemented."
Hence, in the Flood framework the central bank does not sell any foreign exchange in the capital market. This strategy can be called non-sterilized intervention since a change in central bank foreign exchange holding is automatically reflected as a change in money supply.
I indicated above that all of the theoretical discussion has assumed that the central bank in a dual exchange regime adopts the policy of non-sterilized intervention.
In this paper I shall analyze the dual exchange system with neutral intervention and contrast it with the dual exchange system and non-sterilized intervention.
To get out the basics I shall employ a choice theoretic framework quite similar to the one used by Adams and Greenwood (1985) . These authors come closest to recognizing the point raised by Fleming since they do not assume that net private capital flows are nil. Instead they assume that the net private capital flows are equal to some exogenous amount dictated by policy makers. The rule advocated by Fleming requires that net private capital flows are endogenous.
One can as implying that, that if non-sterilized intervention is used, then the authorities regard the amount of private borrowing without controls as excessive, and want to restrict it. With neutral intervention the authorities want to improve the net foreign asset position of the central bank.
II. The Model
Consider an economy which is going to live two periods, period 1 and period 2. The economy produces an exportable good in every period. This good is not consumed in the home country, however; only a single importable good is consumed. This is the most simple assumption to allow a meaningful incorporation of terms-of-trade changes. The utility function of the representative consumer is u(c ,c ), where c1 = consumption of the importable in period 1, c2 = consumption of the importable in period 2.
Utility, maximization is subject to the budget constraint.
(1) plCl + [p2/(l+i)] c2 = I where p. = price of the importable in period j, j = 1,2, i = domestic nominal interest rate, and I = the present value of consumer's income. The optimum choices are cj = cj(pj , pj /(1+i), I), j = 1,2. They give the indirect utility u = u(p1 , p2 /(1+i), I). Income I is given by
must be based on the convenience of the specification. Of the transactions.
costs I assume that v'<01, v"7 0. Finally, tj = net transfers from the 1 J public sector, j = 1,2.
Welfare optimum requires obviously that the consumer holds money balances to maximize the value of income. Hence
where kj is the Cambridge k for period j, j = 1,2. Demand for money in period 1 declines when the domestic interest rate increases.
In the dual exchange system different exchange rates apply to current and capital transactions. Both of these rates can be variable (see Flood and Marios (1982) ), but I assume that the commercial rate, e, is pegged in all periods, e1 = e = e2. The financial exchange rate f, on the other hand is flexible. Consider now the return on investing in foreign assets. The foreign nominal interest rate is i*. One unit of domestic currency buys /f. units of foreign currency which can be used to buy foreign assets. In period 2 the investor has (1 + i*)/f units of foreign assets, which much be repatriated at the prevailing financial exchange rate f2 to give (1 i*)f~/f\ units of domestic currency. Hence, if domestic and foreign interest bearing assets are perfect substitutes, the domestic interest rate must satisfy the relation
where h = (f2 -f1 )/f1 = rate of depreciation of the financial exchange rate.
(Note my assumption that interest revenue i*/f1 is repatriated also at the financial exchange rate, even though it is a current account item. This assumption is made for simplicity only (following Adams and Greenwood (1985) . For the completely "correct" treatment see e.g., Flood and Mario (1982) .)
I assume that the world market prices of all goods are parametric.
Hence pj = epj*, pxj = epx*j , and Bj = px*j/pj*, j = 1,2.
Here pxj = price of the exportable in period j.
To close the system we must still specify the money supply and transfer policies. Money supply in period 1 is In addition the central bank runs the dual exchange market. This creates revenues or losses which have to be transferred to the consumer. In the first period the consumer wants to acquire
foreign bonds. Her/his net revenue from exports in domestic currency is [(l-v(k1 ) )y1 -c1 ]p1 which is augmented by the transfer p1 t1 . The surplus is then allocated to money and foreign assets. Hence she/he has at her/his disposal [(1 -v(k ))y1 + t1 -c1 m1 ]p1 = sp1 units of domestic currency to purchase foreign assets. So she can purchase sp1 /f1 units of foreign currency. Hence, the profits of the central bank form this operation are (f1 -e)sp /f1 , since it has acquired the foreign exchange at the rate e and sells it at the rate f1 . So (10) n = (f -e)s/f = period 1 real profit.
The total value of private investment in the second period is (1 +i* i*)p1 s/f1 . They sell it to the central bank at the rate f2 but have to buy it back at the rate e to be able to buy the importable. Hence central bank profit from this operation is (e -f2 )(1 + i*)sp1 /f1 or (11) n = (e -f )(1 + h)sp /p = period 2 real profit.
n1 and n2 are transferred to the private sector. Total transfers are
Finally by way of definition, it is clear from above that the capital account (inflow of capital), ca1 is
In equilibrium money demands are equal to money supplies. Hence
Using the expressions for the transfers t1 and t2 and central bank budget
constraints (8) and (9) it is straight-forward to show that private income I
The overall balance of payments must be in equilibrium
Finally, the welfare of the consumer is
With non-sterilized intervention the endogenous variables in this economy are i, b, \i , I and u. Among the exogenous variables is the capital account ca; in fact in most models ca = 0 (see the introduction). Adams and Greenwood allow ca = 0 even though they treat it as an exogenous variable.
With neutral intervention advocated by Fleming (see the introductory section) the endogenous variables are i, ca, u2 , I and u. Among the exogenous variables is b. In the following I shall assume that b = 0. We can now go on to analyse the differences created by the intervention policies.
III. Dual Exchange Markets with Neutral Intervention
The equilibrium conditions are (13)- (17). Among them equations (13), (15) and (16) form an independent system which determines the values of i, ca and I, and after substitution of (15) in (16), (13) and (16) form a system which can be solved for i and ca. It is also seen that equation (13) alone determines the domestic interest rate (and hence the rate of depreciation of the financial exchange rate h). Equation (16) 
Consider next the effects on the capital account:
where I is given by equation (15) Hence:
Clearly Jl/^i <0. If i5i* then Jl/acafO, and ?I/0ca£O if i i*. If the purpose of imposing capital controls is to allow the central bank to undertake expansionary monetary policies (relatively to policies within a uniform fixed rate system) then i4i* is the relevant case and the coefficient of dca in (19) is larger than unity. Since c11 p1 < 1 the coefficient is always positive. c12 >0 because the consumptions in each period are substitutes and normal.
Let first z = l^q,-Then 31/ z = p (1 -v(k )). Since Ji/^z >0 the sum of the first 4 terms in the RHS of (19) Since 9i/^i* = 0, the sign of ^ca/Si* is the same as the sign of 4I/3i*. But -91/ai* is rfi/ai* = -p ca/(l + i).
If the private sector is a net debtor vis a vis the rest of the world then 3I/^i*<.0 and 9ca/-^i* •< 0. The reverse occurs if the private sector is a net creditor.
Finally, consider the effects of changes in future terms of trade.
Since &1/ZR = 0 the sign of -3ca/-9fi is the sign of ^I/^fi^ , and Al/^fi >0. Finally, on the basis of (20) and (19) it is straightforward to calculate that (JuAB2) >0
So a future improvement in terms of trade increases welfare.
IV. Dual Exchange Markets with Non-sterilized Intervention
With non-sterilized intervention central bank borrowing is endogenous and private foreign borrowing exogenously restricted.
In fact most models assume that ca = 0. Equations (13) and (16) again form a subsystem from which i and b can be solved.
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The Jacobian of the system (13) and (16) Where does the ambiguity in the behaviour of the interest rate come from? The increase in income raises the demand for money, but it also increases the private sector saving and, hence, the foreign exchange reserves of the central bank. This latter effect increases the supply of money. The net effect on the excess demand for money is unclear and, hence, the interest rate may increase or decrease. This implies that the behaviour of the financial exchange rate is also ambiguous, h/ fi 1 q 1 = ? Domestic monetary expansion on the other hand, has the expected effects:
•3i/©H < 0, 3-b/-5n 1 ^0
Interest rate declines and the current financial exchange rate depreciates relative to the future rate Central bank loses reserves. Note, however, that -1<; -3b/«n , i.e., that the reserve loss is not one-to-one to the monetary expansion, since the decline in interest rate increases the demand for money. This validates the thesis that the dual exchange system allows an independent monetary policy (at least in comparison to the system with uniform fixed exchange rate). but -9u/A|i 7 0 if the capital market distortion created by the dual markets is small, i.e., if i* -i is "small".
The effect of the foreign rate of interest on income is
For definiteness consider only the case b -ca ^ 0, i.e., the country is a net debtor. Then the net effect on welfare appears to be ambiguous since Ai/^i*<l 0 and 9b/9i*>0. It is easy to calculate, however, that alAgi* ± (3I/^b) (ft-b/Ai*) -^-0. Then, since I have assumed that v'k 'y is "small", the net effect most likely is that welfare declines.
Thus:
sign of «J)u/4i* = sign of ^I/^i* most likely Finally come the welfare effects of an improvement in the future terms of trade. Since 5l/9B";0 and -9i/3B?/-0, -Qb/QR i.0, the sign of the welfare effect seems to be ambiguous. Again, however, the term -M/^fl -f &I/Qb) (~)b/3B") ^0. Hence, if v'k 'y is "sufficiently small", a welfare improvement is guaranteed. Hence:
4u/4B = ? but ;>0 most likely.
In terms of qualitative welfare effects the type of intervention does not seem to create any large differences. The only real differences arise in connection with changes in the foreign rate of interest and in the future terms of trade. With neutral intervention the welfare effects had in most cases a definite sign whereas with non-sterilized intervention the effects were, in principle at least, ambiguous. Even in these cases, however, the effects most likely are similar. So there exist differences in welfare effects but to smaller extent than in effects on the domestic interest rate.
The effects on welfare, and on the domestic interst rate under both systems of intervention are summarized in 
V. Welfare and Intervention Regime
In the previous sections I analyzed the welfare implications of changes in exogenous data. But one may also ask which of the regimes provides the highest welfare.
Consider first the economy under a regime of uniform fixed exchange rate. In this regime i = i* and the endogenous variables in the system (13), (16) are b and ca. The fixed rate system is not optimal, however, since the quantity of money is below the optimal quantity (see Adams and Greenwood (1985) for a closer argument in a similar framework).
With fixed rate system the private opportunity cost of holding money is the interest foregone, i/(l + i), whereas the social opportunity cost of money is zero. Hence a system with uniform managed floating exchange rates is socially optimal. The optimal rate of float reduces the domestic rate of interest to zero. Hence, one may compare the dual exchange rate system with the uniform fixed rate system.
Let the equilibrium values of b and ca under fixed rate system be bf and caf . Then the supply of money under fixed rate system is \i + bf .
(Note that under the fixed rate system money is completely neutral: an increase in |i causes changes in b and ca so that db = -dn , dca = db, and du = 0). In section III it was shown that in the dual exchange system with neutral intervention a small monetary expansion increases welfare if initially i = i* (or more generally if i is "close" to i*). Consider now the dual system where the domestic credit \i has initially been set so that (recall b = 0 in the dual system):
Equation (13) then implies that under the dual system i = i*. At that point the level of welfare is the same under both regimes, if the commercial exchange rate in the dual exchange system has been set equal to the exchange rate in the fixed rate system. This is since i = i* and
in both systems. Consequently, an infintessimal monetary expansion in the dual system above n + bf will increase welfare above that achieved in the fixed rate system. Hence, it is always possible to design the dual exchange system using neutral intervention so that welfare is increased above the welfare achieved in the fixed rate system. It is easy to see that this conclusion extends to the comparison between the fixed rate system and the dual exchange system with non-sterilized intervention.
These results provide also the rationale for why I in Sections III and IV concentrated on the cases where ili*. The dual exchange system gives the possibility to conduct an independent monetary policy. This possibility should be used to conduct expansionary policies. The intuition for the result is obviously that if initially i = i* the monetary expansion drives the opportunity cost of holding money towards its optimal value without creating large distortions in consumption.
The comparison between the two systems of intervention within the dual system is more complicated, since one must agree on a common basis of comparison. One natural (?) starting point is the point where both systems give equal welfare, i.e., where the money supplies have been so adjusted that i = i*. Let the equilibrium private borrowing with neutral intervention be can (with b = 0). Assume can >0, i.e., that the private sector is a net borrower. The system with non-sterilized intervention produces the equilibrium i = i*, b = 0 if ca is set equal to can . But one may argue that since ca is a policy variable when non-sterilized intervention is used it must be the case that policy makers want to reduce private borrowing. Hence, consider a small reduction of ca from can , dca<0.
In section IV it was shown that 4i/3ca<i0, 9b/3ca ^0 under non-sterilized intervention. Hence, since isI/5 ca = ^I/-3 b = 0 when i = i*, welfare unambiguously declines when dca < 0. This is seen from equation (21,).
Welfare with non-sterilized intervention is thus below the welfare with neutral intervention. So, in this very weak sense one can judge that dual exchange system with neutral intervention out performs the dual exchange system with non-sterilized intervention.
VI. Concluding Comments
It has been shown that the form of intervention under dual exchange markets matters very much for the behaviour of the domestic rate of interest and the financial exchange rate. Especially striking are the responses for changes in foreign monetary conditions. With neutral intervention the domestic rate of interest is not at all affected whereas with non-sterilized intervention an increase in the foreign rate of interest leads to a reduction in the domestic interest rate (if the country is a net debtor). Similar difference is observed in case of changes in future terms of trade.
The differences in welfare responses caused by changes in exogenous data are not so striking. The most crucial difference appears to be that with neutral intervention the effects are more unambiguous than with non-sterilized intervention.
In normative analysis the most important conclusion is that the dual exchange markets can always be planned in such a way that they lead to a higher level of welfare than the system with uniform fixed exchange rate.
The comparison between the two intervention systems did not provide any clearcut solution, though a very weak case for the superiority of the neutral intervention was provided.
Many of the results can be model specific.
But they clearly provide a basis for the importance of the issue brought up by J. Marcus
Fleming quoted in the introduction but which has been neglected in the literature.
To check the robustness of the conclusions one can utilize the more ad hoc type macromodels. Especially in the portfolio balance models one can add a third type of intervention policy to be considered. It is the sterilized intervention in the dual exchange markets. They provide also some other possibilities to check whether the intervention policies are feasible, e.g., whether they provide unique solutions for the financial exchange rate. I shall take up these issues in some of my future work.
